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The Final Cut: How SAG's Failed Negotiations with
Talent Agents Left the Contractual Rights of Rank-AndFile Actors on the Cutting Room Floor
By: Kelli Shope*

I. INTRODUCTION

There's no business like show business. Within this business,
talent agents and the Screen Actors Guild (SAG) generally focus on
the business, so that actors can focus on the show. For decades,
talent agents and SAG have fought to protect rank-and-file actors
from Hollywood scams and unfair employment conditions. Yet their
roles are distinct; while both represent the professional interests of
actors, agents have a direct financial stake in their actors' careers.
Because of the nature of the agency relationship, actors sometimes
need protection from their own agents. SAG has historically met this
need. In the 1930's, SAG worked with talent agents to develop
standards that would govern the agency relationship; these standards
ultimately took form in a collective bargaining agreement. From
1939 to 2002, actors relied on this collective bargaining agreement
between agents and SAG and enjoyed the benefits flowing therefrom,
perhaps even taking them for granted. The agreement, called "Rule
16(g)," set forth the contours of the agent/artist relationship, and
virtually every actor of this generation was a beneficiary to that
agreement. Rule 16(g) set clear guidelines for agents in their
dealings with clients; for instance, it capped agency commissions,
prohibited agents from owning an interest in productions, required
. J.D., Pepperdine School of Law, 2005; B.A., Arizona State University, 1999.
The author recently joined the Los Angeles City Ethics Commission as a Senior
Investigator. She would like to thank the many actors who engaged in discussions
with her about this issue and Aileen Reid for sharing her unique perspective on
talent contracts.
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arbitration of all claims, and gave actors the right to break agency
contracts under various circumstances. In 2002, this longstanding
agreement terminated after SAG and talent agents failed to reach new
terms. Now in 2006, SAG and agents still have not returned to the
table. Consequently, actors are faced with entering into agencycreated contracts without SAG approval, without the protections that
governed the relationship for over sixty years, and with significantly
less favorable terms. An unprecedented issue has emerged: without
a collective bargaining agreement in place, what is the broader effect
on the contractual rights of rank-and-file actors? A new era of
agency relations has emerged; aspiring actors can no longer afford to
ignore the business in show business.
SAG and talent agents are not the only parties relevant to a
discussion about the current state of agency relations. Many years
ago, California lawmakers recognized the vulnerability of struggling
actors and drafted legislation to protect these artists from agents. In
1978, lawmakers enacted the Talent Agencies Act' (TAA or the Act)
to regulate the talent agent profession for the benefit of actors.
Today, actors may need to resort to this somewhat obscure legislation
as they face entering into agency contracts without the protection of a
collective bargaining agreement. Countless articles have been
devoted to the TAA's effect on talent managers and agents but
curiously few, if any, have been devoted to its impact on those it
serves: rank-and-file actors. 2
The following article will explore the impact each of the above
entities - SAG, talent agents, and lawmakers - has on the contractual

rights of rank-and-file actors in light of the termination of Rule 16(g).
Section II discusses actors' prior contractual rights under the
collective bargaining agreement and how failed negotiations with
talent agents left actors vulnerable to unfair contracts. Section III
explores the new standard agency contract utilized by agents and the

1. Talent Agencies Act, Cal. Lab. Code §§ 1700 - 1700.47 (West 2004)
(hereinafter Cal. Lab. Code).
2. It is important to note at the outset that this discussion is limited to rankand-file actors. This is because well-known and more established actors
presumably have bargaining power and need not rely on the minimum terms set
forth in collective bargaining agreements - they can negotiate. The discussion is
also limited to Hollywood actors, as the New York branch of SAG negotiates
independently of the Hollywood branch.

Spring 2006

The Final Cut

resulting legal implications for actors. Section IV details and
evaluates the substance of the TAA, one of the few remaining legal
protections for actors. Section V exposes the shortcomings of the
TAA and SAG and poses possible explanations for the current state
of affairs in agency relations. Finally, potential solutions will be
presented.
II. SAG's COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON BEHALF OF ACTORS: AN
OVERVIEW

SAG began serving actors in 1933 with one fundamental
objective: "to do all things necessary or proper to advance and
promote their welfare and interests." 3 To meet this objective, SAG
has sought to "establish unity in action"4 in representing its members'
interests.5 Specifically, the "Screen Actors Guild represents its
negotiation and enforcement of collective
members through:
bargaining agreements which establish equitable levels of
compensation, benefits, and working conditions for performers."6
SAG's role as representative, negotiator, and protector in the
actor/agent relationship is detailed below.
A. "Power in Numbers ": Collective Bargainingwith Agents
One of SAG's primary services to members is collective
bargaining. 7 The role of collective bargaining in the entertainment
3. Screen Actors Guild, Inc. Constitution and By-laws, Art II, § 2H (July
2004).
4. Screen Actors Guild, Inc. Constitution and By-laws, Art II, § 2B (July
2004).
5. In recent years, the threat of strikes and controversial elections created
division within the union, evidenced by intense hostility among SAG's two
"parties": the "Restore Respect," now called "Campaign for Unity," and
"Membership First" factions. The two factions remain divided on issues such as
guild membership prerequisites, a merger with the American Federation of
Television and Radio Artists (AFTRA), and DVD compensation.
6. Screen Actors Guild, Inc. Constitution and By-laws, Art II, § 2B (July
2004).
7. In a landmark employment law case, the Supreme Court validated the right
of collective bargaining and reaffirmed its purpose: "The very purpose of
providing by statute for the collective agreement is to supersede the terms of
separate agreements of employees with terms which reflect the strength and
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industry is particularly important. As the California legislature has
recognized, artists in this industry are generally more susceptible to
abuse than employees in more traditional industries, especially in
their dealings with agents. 8 Actors with creative dispositions
essentially place their dreams in the hands of agents with career
objectives of their own. The law governing collective bargaining
agreements gives artists an excuse to not give in to oppressive or
unfair terms, despite an inherent temptation to acquiesce to the
requests of agents. To compensate for their inferior bargaining
position, actors can rely on the fact that they are bound by the terms
of a collective bargaining agreement and face union sanctions or
dismissal for agreeing to less favorable terms. This legal precedent
helped actors in agency relations throughout the sixty-three year
collective bargaining period with talent agents.
B. The SAG FranchiseAgreement: Rule 16(g)
Since 1939, SAG and talent agents worked under some form of
collective bargaining agreement which set forth terms and conditions
in the agent/artist relationship. Negotiations between SAG and talent
agents - represented by the Association of Talent Agents (ATA)9 ultimately led to codified agency regulations collectively known as
Rule 16(g). With over fifty pages of detailed provisions, the
agreement was designed to compensate for the difference in
bargaining power and serve the welfare of the group." J.I. Case Co. v. Nat'l Labor
Relations Bd., 321 U.S. 332, 338 (1944). To protect employees in an inferior
bargaining position, the Court prohibited any waiver of minimum terms set forth in
collective bargaining agreements. Id. Individual contracts undercutting union
agreements would not only undermine union efforts but also violate the federal
National Labor Relations Act. Id.
8. Buchwald v. Superior Court, 254 Cal. App. 2d 347, 350-51 (1967).
9. As the designated bargaining unit for talent agents, the ATA represents over
one hundred talent agencies in their negotiations with the various entertainment
unions. Roughly one thousand individual agents are represented by the ATA. See
About ATA, at http://www.agentassociation.com/frontdoor/about-ata.cfn (last
visited Feb. 16 2006). The ATA offers many benefits to member agents including:
full time lobbying; general representation of agents' interests; meetings with the
Labor Commissioner and state lawmakers; a full-time political strategist at the state
capitol; involvement with relevant legislation; and maintenance of relations with
the entertainment guilds. Id. ATA agents, in turn, represent approximately 90% of
working actors. Id.

Spring 2006

The Final Cut

bargaining power among agents and artists. It also allowed actors to
focus on the creative process, instead of concerning themselves with
the business side of the industry. Specific protections for actors
under Rule 16(g) included the following:
1. General provisions
Under Section III of Rule 16(g), agents were required to obtain a
franchise from SAG. Those who applied for and successfully
obtained franchises were called "SAG-franchised agents"; acquiring
a franchise made the agent bound by all regulations within Rule
16(g).' ° To get a franchise, an agent generally had to comply with
the following: (1) the agent could not include any false or misleading
statements on the franchise application; (2) the agent was required to
post a $10,000 surety bond;" and (3) an agent's SAG franchise was
conditioned upon the maintenance of a state license.' 2 If an agent
ceased to maintain a SAG franchise, any contracts with SAG actors
were automatically void. 13 Underlying the franchise agreement was
the requirement that all SAG members deal exclusively with SAGfranchised agencies.' 4
Once franchised, the agent was free to enter into a SAG-approved
agency contract with SAG actors. Within fifteen days of entering
into an agency agreement with a SAG actor, the agent was required
to submit a copy of the contract to SAG or the contract could be
rendered void.' 5 As with all collective bargaining agreements,
Section IV-B made it clear that SAG actors could not enter into
contracts with less favorable terms than those provided for in Rule
16(g). 16 Any changes to the agreed-upon form contract had to be
approved by SAG and be more favorable to the artist.17
10. See SAG Regulations, Application for Screen Actors Guild, Inc. Talent
Agent's Franchise, Exhibit A, No. 6.
11. See SAG Regulations, § III-J.
12. Further, revocation of a state license would result in revocation of the
franchise. See id. § III-L.
13. Id. § IV-G2. The agent's only rights at that point were the ability to collect
commissions "earned prior to the date of such termination." Id.
14. Id. § II.
15. Id. § IV-I.
16. Id. § IV-B. See also id. § IV-J (stating that "the actor may not waive any
of the provisions of these regulations or of the form agency contracts attached
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2. Fiduciary Provisions
Under Section H, agents agreed to various covenants regarding
agency contracts, each embodying the principle that agents were
fiduciaries.' 8 Most significantly, the agent agreed to:
a) make "all reasonable efforts to assist the actor in procuring
employment for the services of the actor as an actor in the
branch or branches of the motion picture industry covered by
his agency contract";' 9
20
b) make truthful statements in discussions with the actor;

2
c) not intentionally withhold significant facts from the actor; '

in the contract phase
d) avoid "dishonest and fraudulent practices"
22
and subsequent performance thereof;
23
e) "be that of a fiduciary";
24
f) make client lists available to prospective clients;

g) arbitration where a client believed that the agent's
representation of other actors with similar characteristics has
adversely affected the quality of agent's representation of the
25
client;
hereto .

...

").

Of course, well-known or higher status actors are free to negotiate

more favorable terms.
17. Id. § PV-B.
18. The regulations included fourteen specific covenants in addition to the
general provisions of Rule 16(g). See id. § IV-H6(b).
19. Id. § IV -Hl.
20. Id. § IV -H3.
21.Id. § IV -H4.
22. Id. § IV -H5.
23. Id. § IV -H6(a).
24. Id. § IV -H8.
25. Where a client believed this to be the case, an agent had to agree to resolve
the issue through arbitration - if a tribunal found that the quality of representation
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h) assume a duty to the client to "consider only the interests of the
actor in any dealing for the actor, and shall never consider or act
upon the interests of the agent when such interests are adverse
26
to the interests of the actor";

27
i) fully represent the client in the client's career;

j)

be available to clients during reasonable business hours, call
client back within a reasonable amount of time, and always
have someone available to answer phones during business
hours; 2 and

k) at the actor's request, give the actor reasonably specific written
statements describing recent professional efforts of the agent on
29

behalf of artist.

3. Scope of Rule 16(g)
Section IV-F limited the scope of the agency contract to the field
of acting. 30 Accordingly, fields such as writing and directing were
beyond the scope of the contract; any concurrent agency
representation in those fields had to be reflected in separate
contracts. 3l Geographically, agents were generally prohibited from
receiving commissions on compensation from work that an actor

was adversely affected because of concurrent representation of similar clients, then
the tribunal could permit the actor to terminate his agency contract upon terms it
deemed proper. Id. § IV-H8.
26. Id. § IV-H.
27. To satisfy this requirement, the agent was required to: (1) "seek out and

confer with producers and others who may employ or recommend the employment
of the actor," (2) "advise the actor with respect to his career," (3) read scripts
proposed to actors and share his or her opinion, (4) continue procurement activities
even when actor is engaged on other projects, and (5) at actor's request, provide
actor with a summary of commissions that the actor paid to the agent. Id. § IVHiOa-c(vi)(e).
28. Id. § IV -H12.
29. Id. § V -H13.
30. Id. § IV-E.
31. Id. §iV.
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completed in a territory in which the agent "d[id] not maintain an
office capable of servicing the actor ... ."32 As for termination,
under Section IV-D, contracts were terminable at will if the parties so
agreed. Further, where an actor failed to gain ten days of
contract was
employment during any ninety-one day period, the
33
terminable by the actor or agent upon written notice.
4. Substantive Provisions
The agreement's more substantive provisions primarily dealt with
34
agency commissions. Agency commissions were capped at 10%.
Commissions on reruns paid to actors at minimum guild scale were
payable only with respect to the first and second reruns. 35 Further,
commissions were not payable for employment in motion picture and
television jobs which would reduce the actor's compensation to
below the SAG minimum scale rate; 36 in these scenarios, agents had
to negotiate a plus 10% deal to collect a commission. Commissions
on the following were explicitly prohibited: 37 per diem payments;
reimbursements for expenditures related to jobs;3 8 penalties for
violations by the production; 39 and compensation for extra or
"background" work.4 °
Other substantive prohibitions involved conflicts of interest and
legal misconduct. Agents were subject to fines for engaging in or
32. Id. § VII-B.
33. See SAG Regulations, Exhibit E, No. 6, "SAG Motion Picture/Television
Agency Contract."
34. SAG Regulations, § XI-A(l) (stating that "no contract of an agent... may
specify a higher rate of commission than 10% of the compensation or other
consideration received by the actor"). This cap on the commission rate was not
avoided by additional services provided by the agent. § XI-A(2).
35. Id. § XI-C(1).
36. SAG Regulations, Agreed Interpretations, No. I. ("No Commission on
Scale" rule).
37. For all non-commissionable payments, see section XI-G (1) - (9) of the
SAG Regulations.
38. This would include "damage to or loss of wardrobe, special hairdress,
etc." Id. § XI-G(2).
39. This includes meal and rest period violations, penalties for late payments,
and any other penalties resulting from violations of other SAG collective
bargaining agreements. See id. § XI-G(3).
40. Id.§ XI-G(5).
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having an interest in a motion production in violation of the
Regulations. 4 1 Further, agents were subject to fines or revocation of
their SAG franchise for engaging in any of the following conduct:
fraud, misappropriation of funds, charging in excess of the specified
10% commission, or collecting commissions on minimum SAG scale
jobs or on runs beyond the first and second reruns. 42 Again,
revocation resulted in the automatic termination of all contracts with
SAG members; as such, agents had considerable incentive to
43
comply.
One particular substantive provision is worth noting in its
entirety: "It shall never be deemed to be a violation of these
Regulations or a breach of any agency contract for an
agent to be
44
over-zealous in representing the interests of the client."
Lastly, all disputes arising under the agency contract were
submitted to arbitration.45 Proceedings against agents could be
brought by SAG members, SAG itself, or proper state authorities
46
including, in California, the Labor Commissioner.
5. Cooperation Provision
In the spirit of unity between SAG and talent agents, Rule 16(g)
established what was known as the SAG-Agents Cooperative
Committee.47 The Committee was intended to meet quarterly to
discuss the agent/artist
relationship and make
contract
recommendations for the agency agreement which would "aid in
48
promoting harmonious agent-actor relationships.

41.
interest
interest
42.
43.

Id § VIII-B4. See also § XVI-B (stating "an agent or an owner of an
in an agent shall not be an active motion picture producer" or own "any
in a motion picture producing or distributing company.").
This is not an exhaustive list. See id. § VIII A-C.
Id. § VIII-E.

44. Id. § XVII-A.

45. Id. § IV.
46. Id. § IX, Disciplinary Proceedings.
47. See id. § XXIV.
48. See id. § XXIV-F, H.
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C. A Hollywood Union Ends. SAG and the A TA Call it Quits
In 2002, what was perhaps the longest marriage in Hollywood
came to a dramatic end. In happier times, SAG and agents had
agreed that the collective bargaining agreement was "entered into for
the benefit of the members of SAG, both present and future, and for
the benefit of members of ATA and NATR, both present and future.
.
The ATA had characterized its relationship with the SAG as
"symbiotic" and one of "mutual support, basic fairness, and
cooperation." 50 The parties presumably took for granted the sixtythree year partnership and assumed the agreement would continue to
serve their members for years to come. So where did the love go?
And what happened to the spirit of collaboration? No Hollywood
ending here. SAG and the ATA were unable to maintain their
relationship, leaving one longstanding collective bargaining
agreement in the dust and thousands of actors headed for unfamiliar
territory.
The failed agency negotiations and termination of Rule 16(g)
took place as follows. 5' In early 1999, SAG officers and the ATA
agreed to begin a series of meetings to discuss changes in the
industry and to explore the possibility of amending Rule 16(g) to
reflect such changes. 52 Agents primarily wanted SAG to relax

49. SAG Regulations,.Basic Contract, Art. Ill-A.
50.
The
Agency
Regulations
Negotiations,
available
at
http://www.agentassociation.com/frontdoor/newsdeal.cfm?id=103. Further, "over
the years ATA has looked to SAG as its partner. The Relationship has been
symbiotic: success enhances both and neither profits if the other fails." Id.
51. Rule 16(g) set forth procedures and terms for expiration of the collective
bargaining agreement. The agreement was set to expire five years after execution,
but it would continue beyond the five years until one party submitted six months
written notice to the other party. SAG Regulations, Basic Contract, Art. XI-A.
Upon receiving notice, the parties would agree to head back to the bargaining table
to "negotiate with each other in good faith for a new agreement between them to
include regulations governing agents relating to activities of SAG members .... .
Id. Ideally, negotiations would begin immediately to avoid the termination of Rule
16(g). Id. In the past, the parties were able to make amendments when necessary
and avoided the need for the notice provision.
52. It is no surprise that SAG and the ATA have different accounts of the
negotiations. The events as set forth in this article are generally corroborated by
all, unless stated otherwise. For a look at each party's detailed versions of the
facts, see http://www.sag.org (last visited Feb. 23, 2006) (for SAG's Restore
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ownership rules.53 A series of meetings ensued and, in August of that
same year, the ATA provided the SAG national board with a
proposal outlining its suggestions for amendments.54 In January of
2000, SAG offered its own proposal.55 After more discussions on the
major areas of conflict, the parties came to agree on amendments to
the agency contract.56
SAG's National Executive Committee then decided to initiate a
full membership referendum on the new agreement.57 Upon hearing
word of a referendum - something the ATA opposed -

ATA

membership strongly recommended that the ATA and SAG head to
the bargaining table to come up with an entirely new SAG agency
contract with more sweeping amendments.58 The ATA served SAG
with the six-month termination notice, and the termination
Respect party's version); http://www.membershipfirst.com (last visited Feb. 23,
2006) (for the Membership First party's take on the negotiations); and
http://www.agentassociation.com/frontdoor/newsdetail.cfn?id=26
(last visited
Feb. 23, 2006) (for the ATA's version).
53. Talent agents wanted to ease ownership rules and be permitted to own
interests in productions, a venture prohibited under Rule 16(g) as a conflict of
interest and a breach of agent independence. SAG Regulations, § XVI: Agents To
Be Independent. See also Koh Siok Tian Wilson, Talent Agents as Producers: A
HistoricalPerspective of Screen Actors Guild Regulation and the Rising Conflict
with Managers,21 LoY. L.A. ENT. L. REv. 401, 409 (2001) ("The financial interest
rules assure that agents work for their clients. Such an assurance cannot be as
effective if agents also become their clients' employers.").
Another reported concern of agents was the non-franchise status of talent
managers and the alleged impact on the agent profession. Talent managers were
not capped at a 10% commission and were not subject to the restrictions of Rule
16(g). However, under the TAA, managers are not legally permitted to engage in
any employment procuring activities. Cal. Lab. Code § 1700.4. Incidentally,
entertainment attorneys are subject to the TAA as well and may not procure
employment for artist clients. See Waisbren v. Peppercorn Prod., 41 Cal. App. 4th
246, 253 (1996) (holding that any individual procuring employment, including
incidental procuring activities, must first be licensed by the state of California
pursuant to the TAA). See also Cal. Lab. Code §§ 1700.4 - 1700.5.
54.
SAG:
History
of
Negotiations,
available
at
http://www.agentassocation.com/frontdoor/newsdetail.cfn?id=43 (last visited Jan.

5, 2005).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. It was clear at the outset that the ATA did not want SAG members to
vote on the proposed agreements.
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procedures under Rule 16(g) kicked in. Pursuant to SAG regulations,
negotiations were required to begin right away and in good faith.
During negotiations, Rule 16(g) technically expired, however
SAG asked for and received an extension of the negotiations in light
of its concurrent commercial negotiations.59 On February 22, 2002,
under the leadership of newly elected SAG President Melissa Gilbert,
a tentative agreement was reached. 6' The proposed contract would
have relaxed restrictions on ownership of film and television
61
productions and on agency interests in distribution companies.
Agencies would have been permitted to sell up to 20% of the interest
in their agencies to film production or distribution companies and
advertising companies.62
Many SAG members viewed these
proposed changes as being in conflict with the agent's role as
fiduciary and independent representative.
63
On April 3, 2002, SAG sent out a referendum to members.
With a 55% "no vote," SAG members narrowly rejected the new
agency contract. 64 The ATA refused to return to the bargaining

59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See Dave McNary, Agents Paid AFTRA over Pact, VARIETY, Aug. 12,
2003.
62. Id.
63. According to the Membership First faction of SAG, the guild spent
$700,000 to try to make sure members passed the new contract. See Membership
First, available at http://www.membershipfirst.com (last visited Jan. 5, 2005).
Public relations experts were allegedly brought in to convince SAG members to
vote yes. Id.
64. The provision that would have revised SAG rules to allow the change in
ownership rules was a "chief reason for the SAG pact's defeat." SAG Fights
GSAs, available at http://www.wgaeast.org/features/sag-figns-gsas.html (last
visited Feb. 10, 2005). Many actors were concerned about such a fundamental
change in the nature of the agency relationship - a change that seems to contradict
the role of agent as a fiduciary. "SAG's position.., has always been that relaxing
financial restrictions would create a conflict of interest, as the actor's agent would,
in effect or in actuality, become the actor's employer." See Membership First,
available at http://www.membershipfirst.org. The idea of agents as equity partners
in film and television production did not go over well in membership meetings
during the negotiation phase: "time and again, actors said 'I need to know that my
agent represents me and only me in all my dealings with management."' Id. The
concept of agents as employers is regarded by actors as unnatural and dangerous;
the common sentiment is that "the agent works for the actor, not the other way
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table.65
D. The State ofAgency Contractsafter Rule 16(g)
Rule 16(g) was officially history once the ATA refused to
continue negotiations. As a result of the failed negotiations, the
franchise expired for all ATA-affiliated agents, voiding all agency
contracts thereunder. While all pre-existing agency contracts were
considered null and void, at the same time SAG warned members not
to sign any new agency agreements without prior approval from
SAG.
SAG cited Rule 16(a), which forbade members from
contracting with non-franchised agents. SAG actors were in limbo
status, as it was not clear with whom they should seek representation.
SAG members knew that signing with a non-franchised agent was
prohibited under Rule 16(a), was considered "conduct unbecoming of
a guild member," and would lead to expulsion from the guild. Yet
the SAG franchise arrangement had terminated.
In light of the dissolution of Rule 16(g), the SAG National Board
temporarily suspended Rule 16(a), allowing members to sign
contracts with non-franchised agents. 66 The temporary suspension
around." Membership First, available at http://www.membershipfirst.com (last
visited Jan. 5, 2005).
On another note, while many SAG representatives voted against the
agreement, at the same time agents were reportedly giving letters to their actor
clients encouraging them to vote yes. See Roger Armbrust, ATA and SAG Turning
Pact
into
Volcano,
available
at
http://www.backstage.com/backstage/news/article-display.jsp?vnucontentid = 14
54493.
Six days prior to SAG's rejection of the contract, SAG's sister union AFTRA
approved a similar contract with the ATA. The difference in this case was that
AFTRA submitted to ATA's request to not send out a referendum to AFTRA
members. In 2003, Variety magazine revealed federal tax records indicating that
ATA paid AFTRA $500,000 in December as part of the agreement' for AFTRA to
ease ownership rules. See McNary, supra note 61.
65. See McNary, supra note 61.
66.
See
Member
Update
on
Talent
Agents,
at
http://www.sag.org/sagWebApp/Content/Public/memberupdatetalent.htm.
The
"temporary" suspension remains in effect today. On another note, the effect of the
elimination of Rule 16(g) on independent agents remains unclear. On the one
hand, independent agents still have their SAG franchise intact and should be
subject to SAG agreements. On the other hand, if affiliation with the ATA means
reduced restrictions, one wonders why independent agents (the few that remain)
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remains in effect today. The Board "suspended its rule against
members dealing only with franchised agents, promised a campaign
for agents to re-sign the old agreement, and warned members not to
sign new agency agreements if terms provide less protection than
existing standards." 67 The purpose behind the suspension was
apparently to give SAG board members time to explore options to
protect SAG actors, while also allowing actors to maintain their
agency relationships that would be otherwise terminated because of
the end of Rule 16(g). Four years later, Rule 16(a) continues to be
suspended with no resolution in sight. Negotiations on the agency
contract have not been re-established and chances of resuming
negotiations are slim to none - agents have no incentive to return to
the table. Actors can no longer rely on the protections granted by
collective bargaining; instead they face new contracts created by
agents without SAG input or approval. Consequently, agents have
unprecedented free reign over agency contracts.
III. AGENTS REDEFINE THE SCOPE AND TERMS OF AGENCY
CONTRACTS

For decades, agents accepted the role of fiduciary under Rule
16(g), putting the artists' interests above their own. At the same
time, agents clearly have always had a direct financial stake in the
artists' careers. This reality is now apparent in the text of agency
contracts like never before; post-Rule 16(g), the actors' contractual
rights have been subjugated to those of agents.
A. The GSA: Double-Agents Dictate the Terms
With no collective bargaining agreement in place for actors, agents
were left to their own devices to come up with a standard agency
contract. Subject only to TAA restrictions and general labor and
agency law principles, agents created the general services agreement, or

would not join the ATA and surrender their franchise. After all, Rule 16(a) is not
in effect anyway and they could now represent their actors without being subject to
SAG regulations!
67. See Dave McNary, SAG Memo Puts Agents on Notice, VARIETY, Apr. 25,
2002, available at http://www.variety.com. By "existing" standards, presumably
the article was referring to Rule 16 (g) standards.
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GSA. Interestingly, the ATA did not have to rush to devise a new
contract when negotiations broke down; the GSA was submitted to the
Labor Commissioner for approval during the original SAG contract
negotiations and well before the SAG referendum. Agents appear to
have been ready for the dissolution of the bargaining agreement for
some time. Post-Rule 16(g), the GSA has emerged as the industry
standard for rank-and-file actors.
1. GSA Terms
The expired SAG contract and the GSA both contain a declaration
of approval by the Labor Commissioner. 68 The similarities between the
contracts stop there. Suffice it to say that the Labor Commissioner did
not have to mull over a lengthy contract in approving the GSA - it is a
mere three and a half pages in length, compared to the more than fifty
pages of protections comprising Rule 16(g). The GSA terms which
currently define the agent/artist relationship include the following:
a) Geographic Scope: the artist agrees that the agent is the sole
representative of the artist throughout the world.69
artist agrees that agent is the
b) Scope of Representation:
exclusive representative of artist in the following entertainment
fields - writing, directing, music, editing, directing, producing,
and "any other capacity in the entertainment, literary and related
fields throughout the world . . ." and that 70agent shall use all
"reasonable efforts" to procure employment.
artist agrees to pay 10% of the gross
c) Commission:
compensation earned or received by actor or actor's
corporation, venture, partnership, etc. whether or not procured
by the agent. Gross compensation includes, but is not limited

68. The clause "The form of this contract has been approved by the State
Labor Commissioner on January 25, 2002" originates from the TAA. See Cal. Lab.
Code § 1700.23.
69. General Services Agreement, Provision 1 (approved by State Labor
Commissioner on Jan. 25, 2002) (hereinafter GSA). To compare to Rule 16(g), see
supra Section 11.2.c.
70. GSA, Provision 2. To compare to Rule 16(g), see supra Section II.2.c.
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to, the following commissionable payments received by artist or any entity in which artist has any interest - whether or not
procured by agent: all forms of compensation, residuals,
royalties, bonuses, gifts, 71 non-monetary consideration, and so
on.7 2 (Commissionable payments on jobs earned under this
contract appear to be commissionable in perpetuity.)
d) Breach by3 Artist:
7
severally.

artist is personally liable, jointly and

e) Breach by Agent: no breach by agent is to be considered a
material breach unless artist gives written notice to agent within
thirty days of being on notice or constructive notice of the
breach and agent does not cure defect within ten days of
receiving notice.74
f) Right of Termination: either party may terminate the contract
where artist does not receive a job offer in any four month
period and artist is at all times available and other party receives
written notice prior to an offer of employment after the four
month period.75
g) Resolution of Controversies: controversies are referred to the

71. An anecdote seems appropriate here. Shortly after the SAG contract
expired, an actor - who shall remain nameless - asked for clarification on the
commissionability of gifts. The agent, visibly annoyed at the question, replied:
"Here's the deal. If you get a Timex, you can keep my 10%. If you get a Rolex,
I'll take my 10% - got it?" Practically speaking, this means that if an actor works a
scale job and gets a gift, the agent can take 10% of the value of the gift in addition
to the 10% commission of gross. By accepting the gift, the actor would actually
earn less take-home pay.
72. GSA, Provision 3. Further, jobs paid at the SAG scale rate are
commissionable under the GSA, as opposed to Rule 16(g) Essentially, the agent
now has no incentive to negotiate a plus-10% contract, meaning less work and
more money for the agent. To compare commission rules under Rule 16(g), see
supra Section II.2.c.
73. See GSA, Provision 5.
74. See GSA, Provision 6.
75. See GSA, Provision 8. To compare to Rule 16(g), see supra Section II.2.c.
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Labor Commissioner.76
h) Amendments to the Contract: there shall be no amendments
unless agreed to in writing by both parties. Substantial
amendments must be submitted to Labor Commissioner for
approval, unless favorable to artist.7 7
i) Death: if artist should decease, the contract is binding on
artist's heirs.78
2. What Contractual Rights Might Actors have in Light of the GSA?
It is clear that the GSA does not offer much in the way of
protections for actors. But regardless of the new unfavorable contract
terms, actors theoretically have legal rights beyond the text of the GSA.
a) Rights of a Fiduciary
Absent from the GSA is any mention of the "F" word fiduciary.79 It could be argued that adopting the GSA was an attempt

76. See GSA, Provision 10. Arbitration is no longer required. To compare to
Rule 16(g), see supra Section 1I.2.c. This disadvantages actors in many ways.
Currently, the Labor Commissioner, appointed by the state to enforce the TAA, is
required to hear any complaints related to the contract of which he or she approved.
Presumably, if the Labor Commissioner's office approved this contract, it would be
unsympathetic to the artist's complaints thereunder. Actors are also disadvantaged
by the fact that the ATA and the Labor Commissioner have a collaborative
relationship. Earlier this year, the ATA met with the Labor Commissioner's office
"in an effort to form a cooperative effort between the two staffs." See Talent
Agency Licensing: ATA to Share Duties With California Licensing Branch,
http://www.agentassociation.com/frontdoor/agency-licensing (last visited Aug. 1,
2005). A partnership was formed to help with the agency licensing process and to
"better service the ATA membership," and the ATA is now authorized to help the
Labor Commissioner with talent agent license renewals. Id. Another indication of
the disadvantage to actors is that cases decided by the Labor Commissioner have
historically been decided in favor of protecting agents, albeit typically as opposed
to managers.
77. See GSA, Provision 11. To compare this provision to Rule 16(g), see
supra Section II.2.c.
78. GSA, Provision 11. While the agreement is also binding on agent's heirs,
the burden is not comparable.
79. Each fiduciary obligation under Rule 16(g) is set forth supra Section II.2.b.
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to create a shift in the agent/artist relationship. 80 Post Rule 16(g), the
agent may have attempted to strip itself of its fiduciary role and
incorporate the role of employer/adversary, wherein the interests of
the artist can be secondary. However, removing the term "fiduciary"
from agency contracts does not concurrently remove an agent's
fiduciary duty to clients; the agent has acted as a fiduciary to the
actor for over 60 years and that obligation does not end simply
because fiduciary language is no longer in agency contracts.
Despite the missing language from the GSA, actor clients are
8
permitted to bring breach of fiduciary duty claims against their agents. '
The agent relationship with respect to clients is that of a fiduciary; the
law requires that fiduciaries act in the best interest of clients. 82 The
Second Restatement of Agency classifies agents as fiduciaries and
states that agents are not only bound by statutory obligations, but also
may be held liable for common law breach of fiduciary duties including
the duties of good faith, fair dealing, and loyalty.83
Although actors might technically have a claim for breach of
fiduciary duty,84 actors would not likely bring suit against an agent on
their own without the backing of SAG or Rule 16(g) protections. The
inferiority of rank-and-file actors in the agency relationship coupled

80. Under Rule 16(g), SAG could and did bring breach of fiduciary duty
claims on the behalf of actors; arbitration initiated by SAG made SAG the "bad
guy" and took the pressure off non-name actors. In one case, an arbitrator cited

16(g) in ruling against an agent who gave producers a pre-signed check
See
authorization form despite the actor's revocation of the authorization.
Newsstand, Aug. 12, 2003, SAG Arbitration, at http://www.agentassociation.com

(last visited February 10, 2004). He went on to hold that the agent's breach caused
damages to the actor because it destroyed the trust inherent in the relationship,
thereby destroying the fiduciary relationship between the agent and actor. Id.
81. See Lewis v. Katz, No. A 100785, 2003 WL 22321469 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct.

10, 2003) (stating that performers brought and Labor Commissioner heard breach
of fiduciary claim by agent's client).
82. See Detroit Lions, Inc. v. Argovitz, 580 F. Supp. 542 (E.D. Mich. 1984)

(holding that non-lawyer agents are equally prohibited from conflicts of interests in
dealing with clients and that a sports agent violated this duty when he negotiated on
behalf of a player with a team in which the agent was also part owner).
83. W. Edward Sell, AGENCY, (1975); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §

424, subd. 1 (1958).

84. For example, breach of fair dealing with regard to the GSA or a GSA
provision or a conflict of interest if an agent negotiates a contract for an actor on a
production in which the agent has an ownership interest. See supra note 82.
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with the rare opportunity to have an agency contract make these claims
unlikely. As many actors see it, a bad agency contract is better than no
agency contract and alienating agents is not an appealing career option.
By analogy, this line of thinking makes agents themselves necessary without them, producers could get actors to work for free because
working for free is better than not getting the role. Because of the
unique nature of the industry and the complicated relationships therein,
breach of fiduciary claims are not a realistic option here.
b) Unconscionability
Rule 16(g) and the GSA are clearly worlds apart when it comes to
protecting the actors' interests. Aside from a breach of fiduciary duty
claim, an agent's enforcement of the contract itself, or many of its
terms, may be unconscionable. Unconscionability claims benefit
parties in an inferior bargaining position, such as rank-and-file actors.
Actors assume this inferior position because they significantly
outnumber agents, often wait years just to get in the door to see agents,
need an agent to work in their chosen industry, and because agents
typically have a law and or business background which gives them an
edge in the area of contracts. If an agent - in a far superior bargaining
position - subjects an actor without bargaining power to arguably
oppressive terms, the actor can refuse to comply and raise the defense
of unconscionability.
The first inquiry in any unconscionability analysis is whether the
agreement is a contract of adhesion, or a standardized contract "which,
imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength,
relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the
contract or reject it."'85 Here, the initial requirement appears to be met
considering that agents have a monopoly on employment procuring
activities under the TAA, and actors need agency contracts to pursue
their careers.86 Struggling actors have no power to bargain early in

85. Neal v. State Farm Ins. Co., 10 Cal. Rptr. 780, 784 (App. 1961).
86. It is a violation of the TAA for any person not licensed by the Labor
Commissioner to procure employment for actors. See Gittleman v. Karolat, Cal.
Labor Comm'n Case No. TAC 24-02 (2004). Managers and entertainment
lawyers, for example, must be licensed as agents to procure employment. Id.
Procuring activities include occasional procurement and "incidental activities"
including the sending of a resume to a producer or setting up a meeting between an
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their careers and actors are considered "a dime a dozen" in Hollywood.
Thus, many rank-and-file actors must sign the GSA or they cannot
obtain agency representation or pursue their chosen profession. On the
other hand, if an actor does not sign the GSA, the agent can simply
choose to not represent the actor.
Unconscionability also has a substantive and procedural
component, each of which must be met for a party to prevail. In
California, unconscionable contracts are those in which there is
oppression, due to unequal bargaining power, resulting in one-sided or
overly harsh results. Such contracts are characterized primarily by a
lack of opportunity to negotiate. They are also characterized by terms
which limit the nature of recovery for the weaker party but impose no
such restriction upon the party with the upper hand.87 The party in the
superior position can justify such disparities upon a showing that the
and
realities of the employment structure demand the lack of mutuality
88
position.
own
his
maximize
to
merely
not
that the disparity is
Turning to the GSA, there is no clear justification for the lack of
mutuality and exclusion of actors' rights other than to bolster the
position of agents. It may appear to a court that agents seized the
opportunity to enhance their position by forcing an unfair, one-sided
Further,
agreement on actors in an inferior bargaining position.
once artists enter into this agency contract, agents continue to
maintain the upper hand; while the artist is actually bound by the
terms of the contract, the agent can effectively breach without
recourse. For example, if an actor fails to pay the agent her
commission, the artist is in breach - the breach is easily
ascertainable.
Yet, if the agent stops submitting or actively
representing the actor under the GSA, the agent may be in breach, but
the actor has no way of proving or even getting notice of the breach.
The lack of oversight under the GSA enables agents to breach,
leaving the actor with little recourse. The actor maintains an inferior

artist and a casting director. Id. at 11. Penalties for employment procuring
activities by an unlicensed person include disgorgement of all commissions for the
previous year, and the entire contract can be held void. Id. at 10.
87. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal.
2000). In California, for example, courts have found that mandatory arbitration
clauses in employment contracts are presumptively unconscionable. See Ingle v.
Circuit City, 328 F.3d 1165, 1174 (9th Cir. 2003).
88. See Armendariz, 6P.3d at 692.
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position throughout the agency relationship - unless the actor lands a
few big roles and gets some bargaining power.
Practically speaking, an unconscionability claim by a rank-and-file
Hollywood actor is highly unlikely. An actor of this status would
probably not want to breach an agency contract that is generally
difficult to obtain and then get involved in a legal battle with an agent;
why risk losing an agent when agents are essential and so hard to come
by? Further, actors have generally relied on the Guild to fight for their
contractual rights and are probably not prepared for such an
undertaking or even aware that they have such legal rights. While
actors could conceivably argue unconscionability, the nature of the
industry is not conducive to such a claim.
It appears that the GSA is a reality and is here to stay: agents have
no incentive to re-negotiate. Actors are unlikely to bring claims against
agents or breach their highly sought after contracts, and SAG has not
managed to get agents back to the table or otherwise resolve the issue.
The only avenue of recourse may be the Talent Agencies Act. Most
actors probably do not even know the legislation exists, even though it
was enacted for their protection.
IV. LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS TO PROTECT ASPIRING ACTORS: THE
TALENT AGENCIES ACT

Decades ago, California lawmakers recognized that struggling
actors are particularly vulnerable to abuse by agents and in need of
statutory protections governing the agent/artist relationship. In 1978,
lawmakers enacted the Talent Agencies Act, 89 a remedial statute
which sought to regulate the talent agent profession and the contracts
between agents and their clients. Legislative history indicates that
the specific purpose behind the Act was to shield artists from the
abuses of shady agents90 and to ensure their personal, professional,
and financial welfare. 91

89. Talent agent legislation originated with the 1913 Private Employment
Agencies Law, which was codified in the California Labor Code. The law then
developed into the Artists' Managers Act, ultimately evolving into the Talent
Agencies Act in 1978. Philip R. Green and Beverly Robin Green, Talent Agents
and the New CaliforniaAct, 4 ENT. L. REP. 3 (1987).
90. Gittelman, Cal. Lab. Comm'r, No. TAC 24-02, at 8.
91. See Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 437.
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The Act addresses particular problems inherent in the agent/artist
relationship and provides actors with a minimum level of legal
protection in their relationship with agents. Until 2002, Rule 16(g)
was the primary source of protection for actors, thus the extent to
which the TAA offered substantive protections was unknown. Now
that Rule 16(g) has terminated, the TAA may be the only remaining
source of protection for actors. The essence of the TAA is as
follows:
A. TAA Provisions
Under the TAA, the Labor Commissioner is empowered to
handle talent agent licensing, approve agency contracts, and set
general regulations for the talent agent profession. Relevant TAA
provisions include:
1. Licensing

92

The TAA states that "[n]o person shall engage in or carry on the
occupation of a talent agency without first procuring a license
therefor from the Labor Commissioner."9 3 The licensing process is
designed to prevent "improper persons from becoming [talent agents]
and to regulate such activity for the protection of the public. 9 4 To
secure a license, applicants must complete a detailed application,
submit fingerprints, and present affidavits attesting to the moral
character and/or reputation for fair dealing of the applicant. 95 The
Labor Commissioner reserves the right to investigate applicants to
confirm representations made in the application. 96 If approved, the

97
agent must post a $10,000 surety bond to the Commissioner,
conditioned on compliance with the Act. 98 Upon issuance, licensees
must also pay a $25 filing fee and a standard annual renewal fee of

92. This section includes only pertinent provisions for purposes of this article.
To view the Act in its entirety, see Cal. Lab. Code §§ 1700-1700.47.
93. Cal. Lab. Code § 1700.5.
94. Gittelman, Cal. Lab. Comm'r, No. TAC 24-02, at 9-10.
95. Id. § 1700.6(d).
96. Id. § 1700.7.
97. Id. § 1700.15.
98. Id. § 1700.16.
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Licensed agents must then post the license in a "conspicuous
place" in the agency's place of business.'00 Licensed agents are
subject to revocation, after an opportunity to be heard,' upon any of
the following occurrences: (1) the licensee fails to comply with any
of the Act's provisions; (2) the licensee "cease[s] to be of good moral
character"; (3) the conditions, under which the license application
was granted, change; or (4) it is discovered that the license
application
includes
false
statements
or
material
0 2
misrepresentations.'
2. Regulation of Agency/Artist Contracts
In addition to licensing, the Labor Commissioner regulates the
profession of talent agents by enforcing the Act's provisions related
to agency contracts. All agency contracts are subject to review and
approval by the Labor Commissioner. 0 3 The TAA qualifies the
review requirement, stating that agency contracts will not be denied
unless the contract terms are "unfair, unjust and oppressive to the
artist. ''° On the face of the contract, agencies must include the
statement, "This talent agency is licensed by the Labor
Commissioner of the State of California," along with an agreement to
refer all controversies involving contract terms to the Labor
Commissioner for "adjustment."' 1 5 California lawmakers granted
original jurisdiction to the Labor Commissioner concerning all
controversies related to violations of the TAA.' 0 6 Finally, a schedule
of fees to be assessed under the agency contract must be submitted to
the Commissioner for approval and posted in the talent agency

99. Id. § 1700.12.
100. Id. § 1700.5.
101. Id. § 1700.22.
102. Id. § 1700.21.
103. Id. § 1700.23 stating: "Every talent agency shall submit to the Labor
Commissioner a form or forms of contract to be utilized by such talent agency in
entering into written contracts with artists for the employment of the services of
such talent agency by such artists, and secure approval of the Labor Commissioner
thereof'.
104. Id..
105. Id. (specifying that the statement of licensure must be prominent).
106. Id. § 1700. See also Green supra note 89, at 3.
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10 7

3. Ownership Interests
Under section 1700.30, the TAA prohibits the sale or transfer of
"any interest in or the right to participate in the profits of the talent
10 8
agency" without prior approval by the Labor Commissioner.
Further, agents are prohibited from referring artists to any 0entity
in
9
interest."'
financial
indirect
or
"direct
a
has
which the agency
B. Form over Substance: Just Whom Does the Act Protect?"o
In light of the provisions discussed above

-

and others not

107. Cal. Lab. Code § 1700.24.
108. Id. § 1700.30. Rule 16(g) expressly prohibited this conduct. Post-Rule
16(g), agents have their first chance to seek approval for ownership arrangements.
Early signs indicate that agents are slowly venturing into such arrangements. After
the termination of Rule 16(g), William Morris Independent partnered with a
financier/producer to form El Camino Pictures. Cathy Dunley and Dana Harris,
WMA Sets Pic Finance Operation, VARIETY, May 26, 2003, available at
http://www.variety.com. The agency did not seek approval from the Labor
Commissioner, it claims, because El Camino is a financing entity, with plans to
produce 10 films. Id. William Morris claims that the agency owns no interest in
the company but vertically integrated agencies such as this arguably cross over into
production, raising concerns over agency independence which the TAA and Rule
16(g) sought to protect against. Id. See also Dana Harris, New Endeavor for
Interpublic, VARIETY, Jan. 16, 2005, available at http://www.variety.com
(announcing that the advertising agency is set to acquire a minority stake in the
Endeavor agency, albeit its marketing arm). The article explains how the deal was
approved as a direct result of the termination of Rule 16(g). Id. It also suggests that
Endeavor's A-list clients may be resentful upon learning of the arrangement. Id.
109. Cal. Labor Code § 1700.40(b). Other regulations under the Act include a
record-keeping provision - wherein an agency must keep records of fees received
from artists and jobs secured by the artists under the agency contract - and
prohibitions on the following: collecting registration fees, permitting persons of
"bad character" to enter the agency's place of business, and publishing false or
misleading advertisements or information. Lastly, the Act contains an antidiscrimination clause.
110. This question has been posed by many authors, usually in reference to the
TAA's preference for agents over managers. See e.g. Edwin F. McPherson, The
Talent Agencies Act: Time for a Change, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 899,
917 (1997); Katherine Gaidos, Hollywood Rewrite, CALIFORNIA LAW BUSINESS

(July 6, 2002).
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mentioned -" it appears as though actors have some statutory
protection in the absence of a collective bargaining agreement. At
minimum, the TAA should step in to guarantee basic rights based on
its mission to protect actors from agents. Yet since the termination of
SAG's collective bargaining agreement, actors have been subjected
to one-sided, unfair contract terms despite the existence of these
TAA provisions. One problem is that while the conduct of agents is
technically regulated and subject to review, the review is not
substantive and therefore not meaningful. This is partly because all
reviews are conducted by the Labor Commissioner's office: the
office that approved the GSA in the first place, that recently
partnered with the agents' association in the area of licensing, 1 2 and
whose previous decisions overwhelmingly favor agents." 3 Although
the TAA was designed to protect artists from shady agents, it seems
that the Act has done more to protect agents - hence the name "Talent
Agencies Act." The Act has granted licensed agents a monopoly on
employment procuring for actors and, although prospective agents
must jump through some hoops to get licensed, once licensed the
conduct of agents is not monitored to any significant degree.
It is puzzling why the TAA subjects agency contracts to review at
all, if not for a meaningful review. But since a review is required
under the Act, then a substantive review is necessary if the Act is to
protect artists from agents. Under such a review, certain provisions
should have led the Labor Commissioner to reject the GSA,
especially considering that the Act is intended be liberally construed.
C. CaliforniaCourts Support a Broad Interpretationof the TAA

111. See Cal. Labor Code §§ 1700-1700.47.
112. See Talent Agency Licensing: ATA to Share Duties with California

Licensing

Branch,

(Aug.

1,

2005),

http://www.agentassociation.com/frontdoor/agencyjlicensing.
The ATA now has
a partnership with the Labor Commissioner - a "cooperative effort between the two
staffs" - wherein agents help to facilitate the licensing process. See id.
113. In the Labor Commissioner's enforcement of the TAA, talent agents have
been increasingly victorious. Although actors do not often bring claims against
agents before the Labor Commissioner, for reasons discussed infra, cases involving
managers have consistently been held in favor of agents. See generally Matthew
H. Schwartz, Beaten to Submission: Talent Agents Score a Victory Over Managers
on Submissions of Motion Picture Screenplays, 22 J.NAALJ 145 (2002); Gaidos,
supra note 110; McPherson, supra note 110.
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California courts have held that the TAA is to be interpreted
broadly, in order to meet the Act's underlying objectives. 14 If the
TAA were actually interpreted broadly, as intended, then the Labor
Commissioner could have used certain provisions of the TAA to
reject the GSA in its entirety. For example, the "unfairness"
provision should have led the Labor Commissioner to reject the
GSA; under the TAA, contracts are to be approved unless terms are
"unfair, unjust and oppressive to the artist."1'15 The GSA terms
arguably fit this standard. Already in an unfair bargaining position,
actors are effectively forced to sign the GSA if they want to work as
actors. Faced with the choice of signing the agreement, or finding a
new livelihood, most committed actors would not run the risk of
rejecting the agreement. Once artists enter into the agreement, they
are bound by unfair, extremely one-sided terms with no real recourse.
Similarly, the TAA could be interpreted broadly to strike down
specific GSA terms. For instance, the TAA provision prohibiting an
agent from referring actors to companies in which the agent has a
financial interest should be interpreted more broadly to prohibit
agency ownership in productions. 116 This clause was designed to
prevent agents from benefiting from referrals to photographers,
managers, coaches, printing services, etc. 117 The statutory language
"including, but not limited to" ' 8 indicates that agents could be
banned from referring actors to other services, including employer
114. Although most of the cases advocating broad interpretation of the TAA
dealt with talent agents versus managers, the standard for interpreting the statute
should be consistent, especially considering that the beneficiaries to the Act are the
same.
115. Cal. Lab. Code § 1700.23.
116. State lawmakers would likely agree with this broad interpretation because
it would more closely reflect the purpose of the Act. Incidentally, the federal
government has historically disapproved of such ownership arrangements. In 1962,
the Justice Department charged MCA with violating the Clayton and Sherman Acts
for concurrently owning a production company and talent agency. A settlement
resulted - MCA had MCA-Universal handle talent representation under contracts
with guaranteed payouts to talent, to avoid conflicts of interest. For a full
discussion, see Wilson, supra note 53, at 407. However, in this era of relaxing
media ownership rules, the federal government may not intervene as it felt
compelled to do in the 1960s.
117. Cal. Lab. Code § 1700.40(b).
118. Id. § 1700.40(b).
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production companies in which the agency has a financial interest.
The underlying concern with referrals is that an agent will lose
independence and breach a fiduciary duty to an actor because of a
financial interest - the same concern exists in agency ownership. But
preventing agents from sending actors to audition for productions in
which they have an interest is nonsensical - instead, the Labor
Commissioner could have broadly interpreted the statute to prohibit
agents from entering into ownership arrangements entirely, since
they create a conflict of interest.
Lastly, the TAA's fair dealing provision could be interpreted
more broadly to include a fair dealing requirement throughout the
agency relationship. The Labor Commissioner should review the
conduct of an agent, and fiduciary, who suddenly subject his clients
to a contract like the GSA. The sharp contrast of GSA terms
suggests that some agents intended to strip themselves of their
fiduciary role. Binding vulnerable clients in an inferior bargaining
position to unfair terms could arguably violate the fair dealing
provision as conduct unbecoming of an agent licensed by the state.
The TAA requires that individuals demonstrate a reputation for fair
dealing before becoming licensed talent agents. Once licensed, the
requirement of fair dealing in all respects must remain or the purpose
behind the statute is ignored.
For good reason, courts have held that the TAA is to be
interpreted broadly to achieve its unique purpose." 9 It is, after all,
designed to be a remedial statute for actors. However, as interpreted
by the Labor Commissioner, the TAA has done little to ensure the
personal, professional, and financial welfare of struggling actors and therefore the legislation has not served its underlying purpose.
V. SAG:

WHY IT FAILED TO PROTECT THE LITTLE

GuY

Lawmakers and SAG both set forth to fight for the rights of
vulnerable actors in their dealings with agents. The TAA falls short
in various ways and continues to offer little in the way of substantive
protections. SAG let its actors down on this issue as well, and
various institutional problems may be to blame.

119. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 441.
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A. Prioritizationand StructuralProblems
As the primary representative of actors' interests, it is curious that
four years after the termination of Rule 16(g), the agency issue is still
far from resolved. SAG has not announced an affirmative solution
and other issues seemed to dominate during Melissa Gilbert's term as
SAG President. Last September, SAG elected a new President and
new leadership. With new leaders in place, perhaps years of inaction
and poor prioritization will transform into action and initiative.
B. Inaction After the Fallout With Agents
From 2002 until the present, SAG took no significant action on
the agency issue and no clear resolution is in sight. The inaction
parallels the failure in 2002 to take meaningful steps to fight the
adoption of the GSA after Rule 16(g) terminated. In September of
2005, three years after the GSA was adopted, the Guild announced
that national SAG agency committee members would present
detailed information about the status of talent agent contracts and
offer proposals.' 20 Variety reports that SAG "gave no details"' 12 1 - as
of February 2006, SAG still has not announced plans related to
agency contracts. For years, the primary advice to SAG members
was to not sign GSAs, knowing that the average member has no other
viable option. Although many issues affect this 120,000 member
union, SAG seems to have dropped the ball on one issue that
profoundly affects most guild members.
C. Systemic Structuraland PrioritizationProblems
The inability to renew a collective bargaining agreement that
spanned over sixty years is symptomatic of deep-rooted structural
and institutional problems at SAG. While a structural analysis is
beyond the scope of this article, it is worth mentioning that other
failed negotiations have plagued SAG in recent years.
The
commercial strike of 2000 - the longest strike in SAG history - and

120. Dave McNary, Agents: SAG Doing Re-Reg End Run, Org Leaders
Accused of Shutting out ATA, VARIETY, Oct. 19, 2004, available at

http://www.variety.com.
121. Id.
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merger talks between AFTRA and SAG 22 , in addition to agency and
other negotiations, suggest that the actors' union itself is suffering
from a lack of bargaining power.
Questionable prioritization plays into this as well; while the talent
agent relationship affects every rank-and-file actor's contractual and
creative rights, the Guild has yet to shift the issue to the forefront.
Instead, the union chose to make a controversial AFTRA-SAG
merger a top priority.12 3 Perhaps poor prioritization and failed
negotiations explain the results of a recent AFL-CIO poll: seventyfive percent of SAG membership has "no confidence at all in the
124
union's ability to solve those problems besetting it.'
Other possible explanations for the poll include the hostile
division within the union, apparent conflicts of interest of SAG
representatives, and SAG's hesitancy to stand up for rank-and-file
actors. These institutional problems may also explain why the
agency issue is unresolved.
First, as previously mentioned, SAG has been sharply divided
into two opposing factions. 125 When SAG enters into contract
negotiations as a union that is not united, its bargaining position and
the interests of its actors may be compromised.
Second, SAG officers often represent the actors' interests
concurrently with their own interests in the industry. For instance,
former SAG President Melissa Gilbert and other SAG officers have
their own production companies or produce films in addition to
acting, which begs the question: how can SAG guarantee to its
members that SAG officials have their "actor" hats on while
negotiating with fellow producers and agents? While this may not
have come into play in prior agency negotiations, it certainly would if
agents ever did agree to return to the table - this is because agents are
on the road to becoming joint owners with production companies.
Because of diversification in the industry today, conflicts of interest
must be addressed head on to avoid, at minimum, the appearance of
impropriety and, at most, an actual compromised bargaining position.

122. A merger that the SAG President made a top priority despite serious
reservations by SAG members.
123. Claude Brodesser, To Be Continued? Fluid SAG-Producer Talks Center
on Extension, VARIETY, Feb. 17, 2004.

124. Id.
125. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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Finally, SAG must begin to stand up for the "little guy,"
considering that only a small percentage of actors achieves celebrity
status or significant bargaining power. This small percentage of
well-known actors has lawyers and bargaining power to protect their
interests, unlike the vast majority of SAG members. If SAG puts the
interests of name actors first and fails to take on causes for rank-andfile actors, then problems like the GSA will continue to emerge and
go unresolved. A good example of SAG ignoring the interests of
rank-and-file actors involves the 2001 commercial strike. Actors
were clearly prohibited from crossing the picket line to accept nonunion employment, but scabs emerged in that strike and were treated
differently based on status. SAG expelled non-celebrity actors for
crossing the picket line but looked the other way when SAG
members including Tiger Woods, Elizabeth Hurley, Shaquille
O'Neal, and others accepted non-union work during the strike. One
of the expelled actors had even refused to shoot the job upon seeing
protestors on set, but the union would not budge and refused to
reinstate the actor. 126 The problem is this: if the actors' own union
will not stand up for the little guy, who will?
VI. RESTORING FAIRNESS IN AGENCY RELATIONS:
PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE

Although the egregious conduct of some agents led to the
creation of the TAA and Rule 16(g), agents also have a long tradition
of collaboration with SAG and serving the interests of their actors.
Unfortunately, agents currently have no incentive to initiate

126. In a segment called "Screen Actors Guild Bans Little Actors who Crossed
the Picket Line but not Stars," ABC's John Stossel exposed the union's double
standard and inconsistent punishments for struggling actors versus well-known
actors. Upon hearing about SAG's unequal treatment based on celebrity, George
Clooney offered to pay penalties for the expelled SAG actors in an attempt to allow
them to resume their careers. He did not take issue with SAG's enforcement of the
rules - he took issue with enforcement based on status. Again, SAG would not
budge. Stossel attempted to interview President Melissa Gilbert, but received no
response. Stossel intended to ask Gilbert about a non-union production which she
financed and in which she played the lead role. A clear SAG violation, Stossel
pointed out that Gilbert was never expelled - in fact, "[s]he became president of
SAG, the union that protects the little guy." See National Legal and Policy Center,
Union Corruption Update, (Mar. 18, 2002).
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negotiations or to alter the state of the agent/artist relationship other
than for the unpopular purpose of restoring fairness Therefore, it is
up to SAG and lawmakers to fulfill their commitment to protect
actors by living up to their respective objectives. With proper action
by SAG and lawmakers, there is hope for a renewed partnership
between SAG and the ATA.
1. Calling in the Big Guns
As demonstrated in other SAG negotiations, the leverage of wellknown actors can work to the union's advantage in the resolution of
labor disputes. Similar to efforts to undermine runaway production where some well-known actors have refused to sign on to projects
filmed overseas without a legitimate, creative purpose for doing so can make a difference or at
the involvement of established actors
1 27
cause.
union
a
to
attention
least bring
Likewise, high-profile actors may be the best chance of making
headway with agents. Since agents currently have no reason to reestablish negotiations with SAG, big-name actors are needed for
leverage. Name actors yield tremendous bargaining power - agents
need "names" to bring in big commissions. To put pressure on
agents, high-profile actors could condition renewal of their own
highly bargained-for agency contracts on the ATA's commitment to
work exclusively under SAG-approved contracts for all clients.
Many actors remember the struggles on their way up the ranks and
have rallied around union causes to help fellow actors. And, despite
the fact that name actors are not subject to GSAs, they actually do
have a stake in this area: they may ultimately be impacted by eased
ownership rules. If there is one burden that all actors will share, it is
the threat of agents as producers.
2. Legislation
SAG should urge lawmakers to amend and expand the TAA to
meet its stated objectives. The goals of the Act are not being served
127. For instance, in last year's negotiations on SAG's collective bargaining
agreement with television and film producers, countless well-known actors lent
their names to the union's cause to increase SAG's bargaining position and to raise
awareness among SAG members.
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by provisions that fail to offer substantive protections. The ATA
actively engages in lobbying efforts, 128 but it does not have a
monopoly on Sacramento; the actors' interests should be represented
there as well. SAG is in the best position to alert lawmakers that the
agency relationship has changed; the TAA, in fairness, was created
while a longstanding collective bargaining agreement was in place to
offer more substantive protections. The situation has drastically
changed, and the law must be changed to reflect these new concerns.
A good starting point would be to get lawmakers to consider
amending the TAA provision related to contract approval. As
written, the Labor Commissioner may only reject contracts that are
unfair, unjust, and oppressive to the artist129 Instead of the default
position of approving agency-created contracts and preferring form
over substance, the Labor Commissioner should be granted more
discretion to substantively review agency contracts and conduct.
Perhaps the "and" should be changed to "or" so as to reach clearly
one-sided, unfair agreements. That way, actors would actually have
statutory protection from unjust agency contracts.
Further, SAG should consider actively engaging in an ongoing
dialogue with the Labor Commissioner. Again, the ATA has taken
action and established a relationship with the Labor
Commissioner,' 30 and so actors' interests should be represented as
well.
SAG officials should urge the Labor Commissioner to
reconsider the validity of the GSA. SAG could start by appealing to
the Labor Commissioner to re-examine the sharp contrast between
the SAG contract and the GSA. Since the TAA is intended to be
construed liberally, 31 the Labor Commissioner should have the
128. See About ATA:
Benefits of Membership in ATA,
http://www.agentassociation.com/frontdoor/aboutata.cfm (last visited Aug. 1,
2005).
129. Cal. Lab. Code § 1700.23 (West 2003).
130. See Talent Agency Licensing: ATA to Share Duties With California
Licensing Branch, http://www.agentassociation.com/frontdoor/agency-licensing
(last visited Aug. 1, 2005).
131. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 441. The court held that the Act "should
be liberally construed to promote the general object sought to be accomplished; it
should not be construed within the narrow limits of the letter of the law." Id.
quoting Henning v. Indust. Welfare Co., 762 P.2d 462 (Cal. 1988). Thus, it must
be liberally construed to "ensure the personal, professional, and financial welfare of
artists." Id.
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authority to reevaluate the GSA under the "unfair, unjust, and
oppressive standard" with an eye toward promoting the underlying
purpose of the Act: protecting actors from agents and ensuring their
professional welfare.
Next session, SAG must also make talent agent contracts a
priority and incorporate TAA reforms into its legislative agenda.
SAG actively works on legislation in other areas of importance to
guild members and should do so in the area of agency relations as
well. Most recently, SAG co-sponsored two film incentive bills and
a paparazzi bill, and lent its support to bills dealing with spam, lockout benefits, and health insurance issues. SAG clearly has the
resources and must take initiative in this area.
3. Unification and Rehabilitation of the Union
SAG has become bitterly divided over the years, despite the fact
that it exists to protect and represent one cause - the welfare of its
actors. For progress on the agency issue and others, the opposing
factions need to put aside hostilities and internal battles. With
seventy-five percent of the union having no confidence in SAG
leadership, reforming the agency issue may first require reforming
the union itself.
Perhaps a new set of leaders will bring renewed confidence in
SAG or at least begin to heal old wounds. In September 2005, SAG
elected new leadership, with Alan Rosenberg replacing Melissa
Gilbert as President. 3 2 Rosenberg recently stated that actors often
put their craft ahead of their business interests, which is precisely
why SAG needs to be a strong union.1 33 And in his first interview as
President, he cited "unifying the union" as the top priority of his
term., 134 Most significantly, he acknowledged that without solidarity
in the union, the idea of getting agents back to the table is
unrealistic. 135 This acknowledgement may signal renewed interest in
the agency issue on the part of SAG, but it will take swift action to
earn the confidence of SAG members.
132. Interview with Screen Actors Guild President Alan Rosenberg, SCREEN
ACTOR 37 (Fall 2005).

133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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Although SAG has not adopted a resolution related to agency
contracts, SAG has recently held a series of GSA workshops for
actors in which SAG representatives urge actors to not sign GSAs, to
strike out unfavorable clauses and add more favorable terms, and to
get SAG input before signing any agency contract. Further, SAG
members are told that the negative implications of signing the GSA
are real and detrimental, and that respectable agents will accept
changes in the agency contract. One thing is clear: actors can no
longer rely on the protections granted by the old collective bargaining
agreement and instead must start considering the business side of the
industry.
4. Mobilization of Rank-and-File SAG Members
More than ever, SAG members need to acknowledge the business
side of the industry and learn how to protect their own interests. In
the past, SAG members could ignore agency contract terms and rely
on SAG to negotiate and enforce contract provisions. However, until
SAG can restore agency relations and regain its role as the actors'
protector in this area, actors need to gain awareness of the issues
affecting their interests and mobilize. They should actively pressure
their union to make this issue a priority and take a stand with agents.
If actors were to collectively reject the GSA or demand better terms
from agents, eventually the status quo might change. Actors should
demand the respect they deserve and accept the reality that not
having an agency contract might ultimately be better than having an
oppressive one.
VII. CONCLUSION

Actors enjoy the benefits of collective bargaining in all aspects of
the business - from commercials and television to voiceovers and
film. Almost every actor in the industry today also benefited from
the SAG franchise agreement with talent agents. The agreement
offered rank-and-file actors protection from agents who did not
effectively represent them, capped agency commissions, limited the
scope of representation to acting, and strictly regulated the
agent/artist relationship in general. When SAG and the ATA failed
to reach new terms and the agreement terminated, actors became
more vulnerable and less protected than ever before. The new

Snrin 2006

The Final Cut

standard agency contract provides significantly less favorable terms
than those provided through the collective bargaining agreement.
When put to the test, the TAA failed to protect rank-and-file actors
from unjust contracts. SAG has yet to introduce proposals for
restoring agency relations. Consequently, the TAA, SAG, and agents
have left rank-and-file actors caught between a rock and a hard place:
they must either sign the new standard agency contract or try to make
it in Hollywood without an agent. 136 If given the choice, most actors
would likely sign the contract, knowing that they cannot effectively
pursue their careers without one. In light of SAG's negotiation
failures and the TAA's shortcomings, it is clear that actors can no
longer afford to take the business side of show business for granted.
At the same time, newly elected SAG leaders, and ultimately
lawmakers, are in the best position to demand the return to a fair,
even-handed relationship between actors and their agents. Actors
simply want a break in Hollywood; it is time for lawmakers, agents,
and SAG to at least give them the legal break they deserve.

136. Of course, actors can request amendments to the form contract. However,
with a superior bargaining position, agents have little incentive to adopt changes to
a contract they created.

